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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY 
Name your successor? 
For some reason, as yet unclear, the race for succession in the Kremlin has 
started remarkably early.  Last week, Sergei Ivanov and Dmitri Medvedev—two 
prime contenders for the throne—had their job descriptions tweaked a bit 
(actually Medvedev had his clipped), and now analysis focuses on the president's 
sly nomination of two successors.  Two successors?  A leader who appoints two 
successors doesn't really think he can be replaced.  And that may be the real 
point. 
 
As for the new jobs:  Medvedev has been exiled from the Kremlin to the White 
House, where he will assume the revived "First Deputy Prime Minister" position.  
If he is truly to be the chosen successor, then this would be his "Prime Minister 
in-training" phase.  Of course, he would also be a prime target for Fradkov and 
every other politically ambitious denizen of the White House.  Perhaps it is a 
test—a trial by fire; or perhaps Putin simply is fed up with Medvedev's presence 
in his Kremlin office every day.  Either way, Medvedev has lost his access and 
his administrative "tail."  He claims that he will be continue in his role at 
Gazprom's Board of Directors, but time will tell. (1) 
 
Sergei Ivanov, Minister of Defense and Putin pal, has seen his titles augmented 
with the rank of Deputy Prime Minister.  Ivanov, and his coterie, are clever 
operatives and decided to evacuate Moscow for a tour of the regions, specifically 
of defense enterprises (suggesting he is "touching base" with an important 
constituent and contributor base—the arms industry) shortly after the 
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announcement. (2)  The space and time allotted to this trip gives his friends and 
enemies alike the time to scheme—and gives Ivanov time to plan his response to 
the new circumstances.   
 
If accommodations speak volumes about relative position within the Russian 
executive, then the allocation of office space for the new White House officials 
leaves plenty of grist for the mill:  Medvedev will take over a suite of offices on 
the sixth floor, previously reserved for Putin's reformer extraordinaire, Dmitri 
Kozak (who, of course, has since been dispatched to the Southern Federal 
District); Medvedev's First Deputy Prime Minister office will have convenient 
access to the Government's Chief of Staff, Sergei Naryshkin, which means that 
they will have an easier time keeping an eye on each other.  Sergei Ivanov has 
been given a "Guest" office on the fifth floor of the White House—one previously 
reserved for Duma Chair Boris Gryzlov, in case he had to "do some paperwork" 
while at the government offices.  (3) 
 
And in other news Étwo more appointments 
Left somewhat under-analyzed in the frenzy of successor chats are the 
appointments of Sergei Sobyanin to Medvedev's seat as Kremlin Chief of Staff 
(did Viktor Ivanov, Igor Sechin, et al. just lose out again or are they not quite 
Chief of Staff material?), and Sergei Kiriyenko's move to Rosatom. 
 
Sergei Sobyanin, Governor of  (oil-rich) Tyumen, Putin's former Plenipotentiary 
Representative in the Urals Federal District, and former Federation Council 
member gains significant access to the president (and even more crucially, 
control of the access of others) as the new Kremlin Chief of Staff.  Sobyanin is an 
interesting choice, being neither St. Petersburger nor one of the siloviki.  He is, 
and clearly will be in the Kremlin, an outsider, which makes his appointment a bit 
of particularly good fortune for those who will need to guide him (and therefore 
Putin) for his first few months in the job.  Perhaps one of his deputies deserves 
more credit for "big picture" thinking than he normally receives. 
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While an outsider in the Kremlin schemata, Sobyanin has been a fairly high-
profile politician for years, and has, of course, accumulated some very powerful 
friends, not least among them the oligarch-Governor of Chukot Autonomous 
District, Roman Abramovich, who helped get Sobyanin elected Speaker of the 
Khanty-Mansiisk legislature and, through Sibneft, supported Sobyanin's run for 
Governor of Tyumen in 2001. (4)  Abramovich, who has seemed slighted in 
recent Kremlin oil and gas deals, may not be so remote from presidential favor as 
was believed and having a friend in the President's front office can't hurt. 
 
As for his Sobyanin's political views, Anatoli Chubais evaluates him as "similar in 
style" to Putin:  "He is not radical, he is moderately democratic, he is measured, 
unhurried, sensible.  It is a combination of qualities that makes him blend in." (5)  
It certainly doesn't sound like he'll upstage his boss.  
 
Sergei Kiriyenko seems an odd choice for Rosatom.  Although the longtime 
Presidential Envoy to the Volga Federal District also has headed the State 
Commission for Chemical Disarmament since 2001, Kiriyenko lacks the 
experience in nuclear physics or engineering that predecessors Yevgeni Adamov 
or Aleksandr Rumyantsev had in the position. (6)  
 
It is possible that Kiriyenko was parachuted out of his Envoy position and found a 
comfortable landing at Rosatom, or that his western-oriented, economic-
reforming reputation might be an appreciated salve at an agency roiling US-
Russian relations over the Iranian nuclear situation. With the focus of the 
Russian-Iranian nuclear relationship shifting to contingent arms deals however, 
and with the arrest and extradition fight of Adamov, it might be the case that the 
political leadership is hoping to see Rosatom shrink back from the international 
spotlight.  Kiriyenko might be just the sort of leader to temper the hot nationalism 
of previous Atomic Energy administrations and replace it with a cool-headed 
economic mission.   
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Kiriyenko apparently has been tasked with a reorganization of Rosatom, 
separating a civilian nuclear power sector from its predominant military missions. 
(7) Former Atomic Minister Viktor Mikhailov (an early proponent of the Iranian 
deal) claimed that he discussed restructuring plans with Kiriyenko, but did not 
see the utility or feasibility of separating out a uniquely military use.  The plans 
are likely to include the creation of a separate entity to address energy creation 
concerns. (8) 
 
Apparently, President Putin's much-discussed reassertion of the "power vertical" 
is revealing a redundancy in the positions of the super-region presidential 
plenipotentiary representatives.  As this once-vaunted administrative reform is 
left by the wayside, debate focuses on the relative strength and clout of the 
remaining representatives, making more executive appointments and 
restructuring a strong possibility. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) ITAR-TASS, 27 Nov 05; FBIS Transcribed Text via World News Connection 
(WNC).  Medvedev announced, apparently unprompted, that he would stay with 
Gazprom.  
(2) "Sergei Ivanov Attacks," Center for Current Political Research (CCPR), 29 
Nov 05 via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(3) Moskovsky komsomolets, 16 Nov 05; BBC Monitoring, 1 Dec 05 via Lexis-
Nexis. 
(4) "The Unexpected Sobyanin," Moskovsky komsomolets, No. 260, 16 Nov 05; 
What the Papers Say (WPS) via Lexis-Nexis. 
(5) "Russian power grid boss critical of Putin's economic policy," Ekho Moskvy in 
Russian, 1704 GMT, 19 Nov 05; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database. 
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(6) Russica Izvestiya, 16 Nov 05; Izvestiya Press Digest via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database; Gazeta.ru website, 15 Nov 05; BBC Monitoring via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database. 
(7) Russica Izvestiya, 23 Nov 05; Izvestiya Press Digest via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database. 
(8) Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By John Kafer 
 
NurgaliyevÕs fight against corruption 
Over the past several months RussiaÕs Minister of Internal Affairs (MVD), 
Rashid Nurgaliyev, appears to be taking much more of a look at his own cadres 
in his fight against corruption.  Previously, his press statements focused on the 
ministryÕs successes in combating crime and corruption in other organizations; 
his March report to legislators lauded the MVDÕs capture of more corrupt 
officials taking bribes, prevention of money laundering incidents, and confiscation 
of illicit drugs. (1)  Over the past several months, however, his remarks have 
focused on the internal corruption within his police units.  
 
In August, Nurgaliyev made unannounced inspections of police departments in 
several regions and referred to the Òviolations of the lawÓ and Òabsolute 
immoralityÓ he found. (2)  This was one of the few times the police has been 
chastised openly by its minister.  Nurgaliyev followed his remarks by issuing 
special orders that amount to a new ÒPolice Code of Conduct.Ó  He 
commanded the police to be understanding and polite, to abide by the law, and 
not to harass citizens with unnecessary interrogations.  As a root cause of the 
problem, he criticized the police as poorly educated, particularly in the basic 
principles of civilized culture. (3) 
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In September, Nurgaliyev responded to reports indicating that the population is 
far more afraid of police and security forces than of criminal organizations by 
agreeing that MVD staffersÕ disregard of their official duties breeds much police 
corruption. (4) He provided other objective reasons for MVD corruption, including 
police not having enough training and expertise and their fraternizing with 
criminals.  In an open letter published on the departmentÕs web site, Nurgaliyev 
criticized the low moral standards of MVD staffers, their callousness and 
rudeness in dealing with citizens, police using their internal affairs work to get 
rich unlawfully, and police collusion with criminals. (5) 
 
On 26 October, Nurgaliyev spoke in the Kurgan town of Shadrinsk during a visit 
to police precincts in the region, a visit apparently prompted by his lack of trust in 
reports received from senior officers there.  During his speech, he called the level 
of police work ÒcatastrophicÓ and Òrife with violationsÓ and stated that police 
officers boost crime-solving rates by manipulating statistics.  Furthermore, 
Nurgaliyev stated that the MVD witnessed a 41% increase in crimes and 
violations by police officers in the January to September period, compared to the 
same period last year. (6) 
 
Finally, Nurgaliyev used the 10 November annual ÒPolice DayÓ to criticize 
police inefficiency and to exhort the officers to do more to win the trust of the 
people. (7)  The Chairman of the DumaÕs Security Committee, Vladimir 
Vasilyev, also acknowledged that the public had little respect for police authority 
due, in part, to widespread corruption.  He called for an overhaul of the police to 
make them leaner and more professional. (8) 
 
An internal look certainly is warranted.  Recent statistics indicate 38% of the 
population is more fearful of the police than of any other profession. (9)  
However, NurgaliyevÕs introspective criticism is rather new.  Has police 
corruption reached such epidemic proportions that even he, as a former Federal 
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Security Service (FSB) officer, feels compelled to act or is something else 
motivating him? 
 
Nurgaliyev, along with heads of the other security ministries, has been criticized 
for weak leadership and lack of control over their ministries.  Nurgaliyev may be 
trying to accomplish real reform, or he may be trying to distance himself from 
MVD failures and the indignation of his FSB colleagues.  Perhaps, as a former 
FSB officer, his lack of MVD allegiance enables him to act more boldly than 
would a career MVD officer.  In either case, his efforts are noteworthy, but his 
own statistics indicate police corruption is getting worse, not diminishing.  
 
Although corruption within the MVD arguably is worse than elsewhere, the FSB 
cannot be far behind.  Their brutal, unprofessional, and corrupt conduct in 
Beslan, Nalchik, and throughout the Caucasus bears witness to that fact.  
Indeed, corruption permeates all of Russian society.  By NurgaliyevÕs own 
admission, corruption has Òturned from a local threat into a dangerous 
transnational phenomenon.Ó (10)  Anti-corruption efforts within a single ministry 
will have little impact; Russia needs similar efforts within the other security 
ministries and elsewhere throughout its government.  
 
In contrast to NurgaliyevÕs internal look at MVD corruption, FSB leader 
Patrushev barely mentioned corruption within his FSB when talking about the 
need to wage a universal struggle against corruption. (11)  If indeed Nurgaliyev is 
publicly critical of his own ministry because he is a relative outsider, perhaps a 
career MVD officer could lead the FSB and take a similar approach. However, 
with ex-FSB officers currently running all the power ministries and Ivanov now a 
deputy prime minister as well, donÕt hold your breath.  
 
North Ossetia Parliamentary Commission on Beslan 
Stanislav Kesayev, Chairman of the North Ossetia Commission investigating the 
2004 Beslan school hostage tragedy, summarized the commissionÕs results 
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during a recent speech. (12)  Previously, investigation announcements seemed 
to support many of the arguments made by the local Beslan investigators 
(including the Beslan MotherÕs Committee) while contradicting much of the 
federal DumaÕs Torshin Commission investigation. (13)  While KesayevÕs 
investigation remained critical of the slow, poorly coordinated response by 
Russian security forces, he minimized many previously critical actions of federal 
authorities while not addressing others.  
 
Just a few months ago, Kesayev criticized federal investigators on several 
issues. (14)    In contrast, his recent summary did not address the question of 
how weapons were brought to the school, did not confirm that authorities had 
advance information about the impending hostage situation, and did not address 
the conduct of security forces during and after the crisis (including command and 
control questions, the use of tanks, and lack of protection of the investigation 
site).  Furthermore, KesayevÕs investigation did not name persons responsible 
for the poor response, much to the disappointment of Beslan locals.  
 
The previous animosity between federal investigators and KesayevÕs North 
Ossetia investigation seems to have subsided as well.  In addition to KesayevÕs 
earlier comments on the Òsuperficial federal investigation,Ó the Beslan 
MotherÕs Committee remained dissatisfied with the progress of the federal 
investigation and repeatedly called for the resignation of Nikolai Shepel, the 
Deputy Prosecutor-General for the Southern Federal District. (15)  Likewise, in 
June, Shepel described Kesayev as ÒshamelessÓ and his commission as 
Òillegitimate.Ó (16)  With a turn of the tides, Kesayev reported during his speech 
that Shepel, that morning, wished him luck and stated that Òwe are doing the 
same work.Ó (17)  In a TV interview, the chairman of the DumaÕs commission 
investigating Beslan, Aleksandr Torshin commended Kesayev for getting at the 
truth and now agreed there may have been more than 32 terrorists (a previous 
point of dispute between the investigations). (18)  
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The reason for KesayevÕs apparent about-face is unclear, but according to one 
report the sides Òreached agreement and cut all the sharp cornersÓ in the 
interests of the Republic.  Reportedly, the agreement was reached after the 
involvement of Taimuraz Mansurov, the head of North Ossetia, and Dmitri Kozak, 
President PutinÕs envoy to the Southern Federal District. (19)  The Torshin 
commission is expected to release its results sometime after 20 December. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) ÒMironov and Nurgaliyev Exchanged Caustic RemarksÓ by Irina 
Romancheva, Moscow Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 Mar 05; FBIS Translated Text 
via WNC. 
(2) ÒRussian Police-ÔTo Protect and to Serve?ÕÓ by Vasili Kononenko, RIA 
Novosti, 1 Sep 05 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) ÒCriticism With Unchanged Content,Ó Gazeta.ru, 13 Sep 05; FBIS 
Translated Text via WNC. 
(5) Ibid. 
(6) ÒTop Cop Chastises His ForceÓ by Carl Schreck, The Moscow Times, 28 
Oct 05 via http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2005/10/28/012.html. 
(7) ÒPolice Criticized on Their DayÓ by Anatoli Medetsky, The Moscow Times, 
11 Nov 05 via http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2005/11/11/011.html. 
(8) Ibid. 
(9) ÒRussian Police-ÔTo Protect and to Serve?ÕÓ Ibid. 
(10) ÒRussia, Politics, Officials, CorruptionÓ by Vasili Kononenko, RIA Novosti, 
3 Oct 05 via ISI Emerging Markets.  
(11) ÒFSB Head Patrushev Interviewed on Fight Against Terrorism,Ó BBC 
Monitoring, 24 Nov 05 via ISI Emerging Markets.  
(12) ÒBeslan Report Was Heard Differently than It Was Written,Ó by Zaur 
Farniev, Vladikavka, Kommersant, 30 Nov 05 via JRL #9208.  
(13) See "Security Services," The NIS Observed, Vol. XI, No. 1, 20 Oct 05. 
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(14) ÒThere were Actions that Resembled Storming the School,Ó by Pavel 
Pushkin, Kommersant-Vlast, 29 Aug 05 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(15) ÒWe Do Not Rule Out the Possibility of Prosecuting Security Ministers,Ó by 
Margarita Kondratyeva, Gazeta, 19 Sep 05; What the Papers Say via ISI 
Emerging Markets.  
(16) ÒThere were Actions that Resembled Storming the School,Ó Ibid.  
17) Ibid.  
(18) TV Interview With Alexander Torshin, Vesti Podrobnosti TV Russia Program, 
29 Nov 05 via JRL #9311.  
(19) ÒThere were Actions that Resembled Storming the School,Ó Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Marisa Payne 
 
Russia and the G8 
Rampant corruption, a shaky economy and indications of moves in an 
authoritarian direction have weakened RussiaÕs international position. However, 
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Deputy Finance Minister Sergei Storchak 
claim that next yearÕs Group of Eight (G8) summit in St. Petersburg will boost 
RussiaÕs status.  
 
Storchak contends that Russia eventually will become a full member of the G8, 
but claims Russia would not push the issue: Ò[I]tÕs a normal process, no one is 
planning to force it.Ó (1) The deputy finance minister is being diplomatic, but in 
reality, his statement is irrelevant: Even if Russia wanted to, it could not enforce 
full membership in the G8. Until Russia becomes a member of the WTO, its 
chances of becoming a full G8 member remain remote. 
 
Despite RussiaÕs obvious shortcomings compared to the other members of the 
G8, Lavrov extolled RussiaÕs position on the world scene: ÒRussia has become 
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a constant in the international arena.Ó He thinks that the summit in 2006 will 
demonstrate what he believes is RussiaÕs international strength: a consistent 
and predictable foreign policy. (2) 
 
Russia, Iran and the world 
Despite hopes of becoming a full member of the G8 and WTO, Russia continues 
to irritate the Untied States and many European countries with its provocative 
policy regarding Iran. The latest agreement, which stipulates that Russia will sell 
Iran anti-air missiles (against low flying missiles and aircraft) is causing many 
Western diplomatic and security leaders major concern. The deal appears 
intended to secure IranÕs putative nuclear weapons arsenal.   
 
The one billion dollar agreement with Iran, signed on December 2, coincided with 
a visit to Moscow by R. Nicholas Burns, the US Under Secretary of State for 
political affairs. In a radio interview on Echo Moskvy, Burns demanded that 
RussiaÕs Foreign Ministry explain the arms deal, expressing his concern 
regarding IranÕs real purpose for obtaining these missiles. (3) 
 
ÒFor 25 years, Iran has supported terrorists in the Middle East, and that is why 
we have very bad relations with them. You can understand why we do not 
support the sales of weapons,Ó Burns said. (4) 
 
A spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry defended the deal as being: 
Òin full conformity with our international obligations, including in the sphere of 
nonproliferation.Ó (5) 
 
However, the transaction has to be viewed in the context of Russian-Western 
friction regarding RussiaÕs role concerning putative nuclear proliferation in Iran. 
 
ÒWe believe Russia is a country that has influence over Iran, and we want Iran 
to return to negotiations,Ó Burns noted. (6) However, while Russian leaders have 
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expressed agreement with the United States and Europe that Iran should not 
have nuclear weapons, Russia continues to provide nuclear materials to Iran. 
The agreement between Russia and Iran does contain a stipulation stating that 
the nuclear material is only to be used for energy needs, but without a clear 
means of enforcement of that clause, there is substantial cause for worry still 
exists. 
 
Secretary of IranÕs High Council of National Security, Ali Larijani,  claimed that 
Ò...This is not the first time we have bought an anti-missile system. We also 
make them ourselves.Ó (7) 
 
LarijaniÕs statement is misleading. While Iran produces their own surface-to-
surface missiles, specifically the Mushak and Fateh series, the country is not 
known to produce any surface-to-air missiles. (8) Moreover, the act of buying 
surface-to-air missiles is not what is upsetting to the international community. It is 
the type of missiles sold that makes this deal especially controversial. 
 
Russia has agreed to sell Iran anti-air missiles against low flying missiles and 
aircraft, that can fly under the radar, thus attacking nuclear facilities. The deal is 
troubling, especially at a time when Iran is planning to continue its nuclear 
enrichment work regardless of what the US or the Europeans want. 
 
Larijani has stated that nuclear enrichment work would start Òwithin a few 
months.Ó 
 
ÒThis is not up for negotiation, and the when and how of a resumption concerns 
us alone,Ó Larijani said, (9) claiming that Iran is Òready to give guaranteesÓ that 
it will not make nuclear weapons. (10) However, Òready to give guaranteesÓ is 
not the same as actually giving guarantees and the issue of whether Russia is 
willing to regulate the nuclear production of a close ally in order to please the 
international community is debatable. 
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Russian press predictably defends Putin 
Sergei Zemyanoi, a doctoral student of philosophy, claims Russia faces a choice 
between either becoming a sovereign power or once again becoming an empire. 
The article, which was published in Politichesky zhurnal, contends that the United 
States is making it hard for Russia to take the first path because of the WestÕs 
Òanti-Putin campaign.Ó (11) 
 
Zemlyanoi tries hard to establish that there is a viable force inside of Russia to 
take on Putin and his United Russia party. The problem with this article is that 
there is no real opposition to Putin. While there are extremists who clamor for a 
return to Cold War style politics or even to a Tsarist empire, these parties, led by 
compromised figures, such as Edvard Limonov and Vladimir Zhirinovsky, are 
hardly viable contenders in Russia today, where the presidentÕs approval ratings 
constantly hover around 70 percent. 
 
The ÒRussia at the CrossroadsÓ approach to foreign policy analysis, as set out 
by Zemlyanoi, is viewed more as comedy (tragic though it may be), especially by 
RussiaÕs neighbors, such as Georgia and Ukraine, than as serious political 
discourse.    
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Reuters, 3 Dec 05 via JohnsonÕs Russia List (JRL) #9311, Dec. 3, 2005. 
(2) RIA Novosti, 28 Nov 05 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(3) ÒRussia to Sell Anti-Aircraft Missiles to Iran in Billion Dollar DealÓ by Andrew 
Kramer. New York Times, 3 Dec 05. 
(4) Ibid. 
(5) RIA Novosti, 3 Dec 05 via http://en.rian.ru/russia/20051203/42303019.html. 
(6) ÒRussia to Sell Anti-Aircraft Missiles to Iran in Billion Dollar DealÓ by Andrew 
Kramer. New York Times, 3 Dec 05. 
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(7) Al-Jazeera, 4 Dec 05 via http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/C1AD09BE-
A1D6-4EF6-A1E4-A54331B0F0D0.htm. 
(8) GlobalSecurity.org, 28 Apr 05 via 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/mushak.htm. 
(9) Al-Jazeera, 4 Dec 05 via http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/C1AD09BE-
A1D6-4EF6-A1E4-A54331B0F0D0.htm. 
(10) Ibid. 
(11) What the Papers Say (WPS), 1 Dec 05 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Robyn Angley 
 
Moscow elections 
The elections to the newly restructured Moscow city Duma were dominated by 
United Russia, which won 28 out of 35 seats. United Russia, which has the 
support of the President and whose ticket was led by Moscow Mayor Yuri 
Luzkhov, won 13 out of 20 seats elected by party lists and all 15 of the single-
mandate seats. The Communist Party, which was not represented in the last 
Duma (elected in 2001), received 17 percent of the vote and will hold four seats 
in the new Duma. Yabloko, the liberal democratic party cobbled together from 
Yabloko and Union of Right Forces (SPS), earned 11 percent of the vote, proving 
that it could woo a constituency despite internal haggling. (1) However, Moscow 
in the halcyon days after the USSRÕs implosion had been the democratic 
stronghold.  The other parties and factions that contested the election but failed 
to pass the 10 percent threshold for representation in the city Duma included the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR), Party of Life, the Green party, Free Russia, 
Party of Social Justice and PeopleÕs Will. The Russian Election Commission 
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has declared that there were no serious infringements of election law, despite the 
fact that some members of Yabloko were crying foul. (2) 
 
The previous Moscow Duma was composed of four parties. United Russia held 
18 seats, Rodina (Motherland) four seats, Russian Party of Life three seats, and 
SPS two. The new composition of United Russia 28, Communists four, and 
Yabloko three, reflects the changing nature of Russian politics and, according to 
critics, LuzkhovÕs attempt to protect his own network before leaving office by 
securing for them places in the municipal organs. However, there is some 
speculation that Luzkhov may not leave office after all, but will instead use the 
United Russia majority in the City Duma to return to his position. (3) The new 
Moscow Duma will be responsible for appointing the next mayor of Moscow.  
 
A list that did not receive any votes was the Rodina party, which held four seats 
in the previous Duma. The partyÕs name was removed from the ballot following 
charges by the nationalist Liberal Democratic Party that RodinaÕs election 
advertising was inciting ethnic strife. RodinaÕs television ad showed two men of 
non-Slavic descent picking up watermelon rinds and trash from the dirt. A voice 
over said, ÒDo you speak any Russian at all?Ó and was followed by an 
injunction from party leader Dmitri Rogozin. ÒLetÕs clean up our city. LetÕs 
clear away all the dirt.Ó (4)  
 
The Moscow Municipal Court ruled on 26 November that Rodina be removed 
from the elections because of the television ad. Rodina appealed the case to the 
Supreme Court, but it upheld the decision. The allegations from LDPR reflect the 
contention between two parties that are using nationalistic appeals to rally the 
electorate. During the course of the electoral campaign, each party had accused 
the other of provoking ethnic tension. Of the two, RodinaÕs chance of a 
successful election was the greater prior to its television fiasco. A poll taken by 
the Levada Center just before the Municipal Court ruling showed that Rodina 
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could expect support from 15 percent of the respondents. However, RodinaÕs 
support appears to have been picked up the Communists rather than the LDPR. 
 
Public Chamber, NGOs, and protest 
The bill mandating the re-registration of NGOs and imposing harsher regulations 
on NGOs that receive foreign funding has caused quite a controversy, both 
domestically and in the international arena. In the Public Chamber, a body whose 
stated purpose is to provide societal oversight of state organs in general and the 
legislature in particular, the bill has led to the ChamberÕs first attempt to 
exercise its rights. Twenty-one of the ChamberÕs members have submitted a 
letter to the Duma requesting that the new bill on NGOs be delayed so the 
chamber can review it before it is passed.  
 
Ella Pamfilova, head of the Council for Facilitating the Development of Civil 
Society Institutions and Human Rights, recently met with Putin to discuss the bill. 
Pamfilova said that the law violates the Russian Constitution as well as RussiaÕs 
obligations under international law. She also raised the issue of what impact this 
bill might have on RussiaÕs influence in its Ònear abroad.Ó She stated that 
ÒÉthis draft law would also deal a serious blow to our cooperation with our 
compatriots abroad, especially in the post-Soviet area. It also contradicts what is 
a good idea – that of allocating budget funds to support our public organizations 
[sic] in the neighboring countries.Ó (5)  Putin responded that he would speak to 
the Duma Òto ensure that any measures taken in this area are not to the 
detriment of civil society in Russia.Ó (6) 
 
The NGO bill also is affecting RussiaÕs relationship with the United States. The 
two countries are engaged in a tit-for-tat squabble over the nature of democracy 
and the extent to which countries can support NGOs in other nations. The US 
Congress recently allotted four million dollars for the promotion of democracy in 
Russia. In response, Russia designated more than $17 million for use in 
promoting civil society in Russia and its Ònear abroad.Ó Now a hefty team of 
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officials from the US State Department are headed to Moscow. Officially, the 
purpose of the trip is to discuss counterterrorism, but an anonymous American 
source cited in Kommersant has mentioned that the conversation will also 
include the controversial legislation. (7) 
 
Media report 
Anchorwoman Olga Romanova of Ren-TV was cut from the lineup after stating 
on Ekho Moskvy that the stationÕs leadership was exercising restrictive control 
over the content of her program, Ò24.Ó Romanova claimed that shortly after the 
Ekho Moskvy interview, she was prevented from entering the station by three 
security guards. Among the offending pieces that the management withheld from 
broadcasting was a segment on how Aleksandr Ivanov, son of Defense Minister 
Sergei Ivanov, was not charged for the death of an aging pedestrian who died as 
a result of being struck by his vehicle in May. (8) Romanova has handed in her 
resignation to the television station along with several other employees who had 
worked on Ò24.Ó (9) 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) ÒThree parties win Moscow Duma mandates,Ó 5 Dec 05, ITAR-TASS via 
Lexis-Nexis. 
(2) ÒYabloko party reports abuses in Moscow elections,Ó 5 Dec 05, Interfax; 
FBIS Transcribed Text via WNC. 
(3) ÒYuri Luzhkov: Muscovites have made their choice," 6 Dec 05, Rossiyskaya 
gazeta;  FBIS Translated Text via WNC. 
(4) ÒRodina party in last ditch appeal before 4 December polls,Ó 1 Dec 05, 
ITAR-TASS; FBIS Transcribed Text via WNC. 
(5) ÒBeginning of meeting with Chairwoman of the Council for Facilitating the 
Development of Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights Ella Pamfilova,Ó 24 
Nov 05; 
http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/11/24/2210_type82913_98112.shtml. 
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(6) Ibid. 
(7) ÒNon-foreign-government organizations,Ó 1 Dec 05, Izvestiia Press Digest; 
Russica Izvestiia via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(8) ÒForced removal,Ó 28 Nov 05, Izvestiia Press Digest; Russica Izvestiia via 
ISI Emerging Markets. 
(9) ÒRomanova, several others to quit REN-TV,Ó 5 Dec 05, Interfax; FBIS 
Transcribed Text via WNC. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Marcel LeBlanc and Jeffrey Butler 
 
INTERNAL 
The plight of the space program 
RussiaÕs military and civilian space capability continues to deteriorate as 
highlighted by a series of failed launches and the recent firing of a senior space 
agency official.  In June, a critical military communications satellite was lost 
shortly after launch.  The Molniya-M communications satellite was launched from 
the Plesetsk military space center; unfortunately, the rocket crashed in its sixth 
minute of flight. (1)  After an investigation, the Space Forces attributed the most 
likely cause of the crash to a second stage engine failure. (2)  This was followed 
the next day by another unsuccessful launch when an experimental US-Russian 
satellite, the Solar Sail, failed to achieve orbit following launch from a Russian 
submarine.  The rocket was launched effectively from the submarine but the 
booster shut down prematurely resulting in an unrecoverable loss. (3) 
 
The launch maladies of the Russian space program resurfaced in October with 
additional failures.  The most egregious was the loss of the European Space 
AgencyÕs (ESA) CryoSat satellite which was destroyed following the failure of its 
Russian booster.  The $140 million plus satellite was a cornerstone of the ESAÕs 
plan to study global warming.  This was also a prime opportunity for RussiaÕs 
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beleaguered space industry to accumulate badly needed foreign cash.  The 
Nezavisimaya gazeta lamented, "The scale of losses from that failure is hard to 
calculate.  Accidents like that which happened to CryoSat may irrevocably 
undermine Western customers' confidence in Russia's delivery vehicles." (4)  To 
make matters worse, an unmanned Demonstrator spacecraft was also lost in 
October following launch from a Russian submarine.  The satellite controllers lost 
control of the vehicle as it approached its target.  This experimental spacecraft 
was designed to demonstrate a cheap alternative to the Soyuz spacecraft for 
transporting cargo to the international space station.  It was the fourth failure of 
the Demonstrator, leading an Izvestiya journalist to comment: "It seems that the 
spacecraft is haunted by doom." (5)  Also in October, Russian engineers lost 
contact with a previously launched Earth-monitoring satellite and a new optical 
research satellite was lost due to a booster failure. (6) 
 
The plight of the Russian space program has attracted high level government 
and industry attention.  Two days after the loss of the Molniya-M satellite, Anatoli 
Perminov, the head of the Russian Space Agency (Roskosmos) publicly declared 
that whoever was at fault for the crash would be brought to justice. (7)  Perminov 
further stated that if the rocket was designed poorly the culprits would be 
prosecuted, or if operator error was involved then the senior officers of the Space 
Corps would be reprimanded. (8)   Not surprisingly, the officers of the Space 
Corp recommended filing a lawsuit against the rocket manufacturer following a 
surely impartial review of the incident.  Space Force Commander Vladimir 
Popovkin stated: "We have sent a complaint to the rocket's producer and are 
considering filing a lawsuit together with the Russian Space Agency 
(Roskosmos) to sue the factory through an arbitration court for the expenses 
incurred by the Defense Ministry.Ó (9)  Popovkin was willing to allow some 
accommodation, ÒOf course, we cannot ruin the Progress design bureau, which 
produced the miserable rocket. Unfortunately, there are no other rocket 
producers and we are well aware of that." (10) 
 
 20 
The consequences of failure for the loss of the ESA launch were more personal 
as President Putin fired the head of RussiaÕs Khrunichev space construction 
company responsible for building the faulty Rokot booster.  In November, Putin 
signed a decree installing Vladimir Nesterov as the head of Khrunichev while 
relieving Aleksandr Medvedev of this responsibility. (11)   MedvedevÕs company 
publicly apologized for the loss of the CryoSat, but it apparently was not enough 
to save his job. (12) 
 
While the Russian space program is having difficulty getting satellites to orbit, the 
ones already there are experiencing decline.  Most of RussiaÕs satellites are 
well beyond their design life with little hope of reconstituting the constellation 
back to the level of the Soviet era.  In November, Anatoli Perminov reported to 
Russian lawmakers that, ÒRussia has only 96 spacecraft in space, 62 of them 
well past their service life." (13)  As for military satellites, the head of Roskomos 
said, Ò33 out of 40 spacecraft have outlasted their usefulness.Ó (14)  At the 
same conference, General Oleg Gromov, deputy commander of the Space 
Forces stated the, Òmissile-attack warning system can no longer be restored 
through the launch of the hopelessly obsolete 71X6 and 73D6 satellites.Ó (15)  
He also announced that Russia has fewer than half (3 of 8) of the satellites it 
needs for space-based missile launch detection.  Other types of military 
reconnaissance satellites are also in dire straights even by General GromovÕs 
own assessment, ÒTwelve or 13 US electronics intelligence spacecraft are 
permanently monitoring us, we have only one such craft that is flying." (16)  
 
While the constellation ages, new Russian space capabilities are predictably 
falling behind.  Col-General Aleksandr Zelin, deputy commander of the Air Force 
reported that Russian aviation uses the American Global Positioning System 
(GPS) as a stopgap because RussiaÕs own GLONASS navigation satellite 
system does not have enough satellites to support flight over all of the Russian 
territory. (17)  This is a major deficiency as US armed forces have shown the 
tremendously positive effect precision navigation and timing standards have on 
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modern combat forces.  The US GPS is available globally for peacetime use, but 
the high-precision modes can be selectively encrypted and would then be only 
available to forces with the proper US-controlled military gear.  Consequently, 
Russian forces are partially dependent on the good favor of the US military until 
the GLONASS system reaches full operational capability. 
 
A prime example of the disconnect between funding and reality is RussiaÕs 
GLONASS system, which is scheduled to be fully populated by 2007.  The 
program is severely under funded and needs a significant boost in financing to 
hold this schedule.  RussiaÕs top space official publicly lobbied for an additional 
$100 million after declaring that the GLONASS program was 72% under funded. 
(18)  On a larger scale, RussiaÕs funding for space is nearly 30 times less than 
that of the US and 2.5 times less than China according to Roskosmos. (19)  
Anatoli Perminov expounded on this assessment stating Òthe United States 
spends $16.4 billion on space needs, we, $800 million as of 2007." (20)  $800 
million per year is not nearly sufficient to maintain the Russian space industry, 
ground infrastructure, and current spending on orbit satellites.  
 
Furthermore, this level of funding is insufficient to produce satellites incorporating 
next generation technologies.  For example, the US plans to spend over a billion 
dollars in 2006 alone for development of two new communication satellites: the 
Advanced EHF and the Transformational Satellite. (21)  Given the problems and 
delays that plague US satellite development even with hefty funding levels, it is 
unlikely Russia will make much progress in developing advanced satellite 
technology with its meager resources.  Perminov succinctly summarized the 
Russian disconnect between expectations and reality as, ÒOur people do not 
understand why we cannot cater for the same timeframe and level of space 
developments as the United States, and hoping that it will be possible to 
preserve the balance of forces with this level of funding is utopia." (22) 
 
 Conclusions 
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The plight of the Russian space program has significant implications.  First, the 
deterioration of the early warning system contributes to RussiaÕs perceived 
need to maintain a large nuclear arsenal.  Russia must rely on ground based 
radar to detect a missile launch, which does not give enough time to sort through 
the data and make a sound decision before launching a counterstrike.  Indeed, 
RussiaÕs deterrence is based on maintaining a nuclear arsenal large enough to 
survive a large-scale attack with enough weapons to mount a credible retaliatory 
strike.  In addition, the decline of the Russian space-based early warning system 
increases the importance of data sharing between the West and Russia in order 
to prevent mistakes with regard to false alarms since Russia has little remaining 
indigenous capability. 
 
The inability of the space program to deliver reliable communications and 
intelligence limits the effectiveness of the military.  The incorporation of space 
assets has been a key factor in the surge in US conventional capability in the 
years since the end of the Cold War.  
 
Finally, thereÕs little hope of recovery for the Russian space program if the 
fragmented industrial base is not restructured, utopian expectations are not 
replaced by realistic goals, and funding is not increased to an appropriate level.  
The Cold War inventory of Russian rockets and satellites is dwindling and the 
clock is ticking. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) ÒSpace Forces to sue over Molniya-M rocket crash,Ó RIA Novosti, 15 Jul 05 
via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(2) Ibid. 
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Lexis-Nexis. 
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EXTERNAL 
The NATO-Russia Council: cooperation and conflict 
At NATO Headquarters on 8 December 2005, the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) 
will meet at the level of foreign ministers.  This twice-annual gathering follows 
NovemberÕs meeting of the NRC at the chiefs of staff level. (1)  Observers to the 
meeting on the 8th should expect to hear themes that similarly were present at 
NovemberÕs meeting.  Namely, Russia will continue to pursue its sometimes 
antagonistic and often contradictory partnership with NATO.  The difficulties in 
this relationship will be manifest in at least three ways: RussiaÕs hesitancy to 
participate in a NATO naval exercise that potentially could expand into the Black 
Sea; RussiaÕs general support of NATO peacekeeping operations throughout 
the world, except, of course, in Georgia and Moldova; and, RussiaÕs persistent 
resistance to compliance with the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty 
(CFE). 
 
Operation Active Endeavor 
At NovemberÕs NRC meeting for chiefs of staff, General Yuri Baluyevsky, chief 
of the Russian General Staff, pledged RussiaÕs military cooperation with NATO 
in Operation Active Endeavor.  (2) The latter is a joint naval exercise NATO 
began in 2001 as a means to Òhelp detect and deter terrorist activity in the 
Mediterranean.Ó (3) The annual exercise is multi-faceted but mainly involves the 
monitoring, boarding, and inspection of ships at sea. Although Baluyevsky 
pledged RussiaÕs cooperation in Active Endeavor, he also reserved the right to 
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withdraw from the exercise as Russia sees fit. (4)  This is a threat Russia 
implemented when it last promised Active Endeavor participation at the end of 
2003. Russia withdrew from that exercise for a number of reasons, most notably 
the reticence of Russian ships to participate in Òmutual inspection procedures.Ó 
(5)  Ironically, it is RussiaÕs interests in the Black Sea that will affect its ultimate 
decision to participate in next yearÕs Active Endeavor. 
 
Russia wants to keep NATO out of the northern and eastern portions of the Black 
Sea, and it will use Active Endeavor for leverage. Chief among RussiaÕs 
concerns could be that Active Endeavor sets a precedent of NATO military 
cooperation that subsequently could challenge Russian activities in the Black 
Sea.  Currently, RussiaÕs military presence in breakaway Abkhazia renders 
possible Russian maritime activity at the port of Sukhumi; a significant portion of 
RussiaÕs arms industry is located on TransdniestrÕs Dnestr River as it flows 
through the separatist region and into the Black Sea; and, finally, RussiaÕs Black 
Sea Fleet is based in the (Crimean) territory of Warsaw-member-turned-NATO-
partner Ukraine. (6) Russia can secure these interests by keeping Active 
Endeavor from moving out of the Mediterranean and by pre-empting a Black Sea 
version of the exercise with one of its own. 
 
Peacekeeping operations 
In addition to RussiaÕs pledge of support for Operation Active Endeavor, it also 
has pledged to support other NATO missions around the globe, including 
NATOÕs International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. (7) Although 
Russia supplies little more than technical assistance in Afghanistan, its 
commitment nonetheless is significant given the location, and RussiaÕs history 
there. Also, in the past Russia has partnered with NATO in more meaningful 
ways, such as providing sizeable troop commitments to NATOÕs peacekeeping 
operations in the Balkans.  However, RussiaÕs commitments to Afghanistan and 
its participation in the Balkans will not translate to Georgia and Moldova, where 
Russia does not want NATOÕs help. 
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Russian troops have been serving as ÒgarrisonsÓ or ÒpeacekeepersÓ both in 
Georgia and Moldova for more than a decade, increasingly despite the demands 
of the two sovereign republics to leave. Although Russia recently changed its 
military footprint in Georgia, it still has no plans to vacate the country–especially 
as Georgia continues to move toward NATO membership. (8) The same holds 
true in Moldova where Russia maintains about 1,500 troops which, at last yearÕs 
NRC meeting, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov stated would remain in Moldova 
Òindefinitely.Ó (9) That Georgia and Moldova are NATO partner countries in 
search of more substantial relationships with NATO only adds a further excuse 
for staying. Moldova expects to finalize its Individual Partnership Action Plan with 
NATO next year. (10) Meanwhile, GeorgiaÕs foreign minister has expressed his 
countryÕs desire Òto adopt the NATO accession plan as early as 2006.Ó (11) 
Russia counters NATO influence by further entrenching its military troop 
presence in Georgia and Moldova, where the governments seek to join NATO as 
a hedge against RussiaÕs persistent pressures. 
 
Arms reduction in the ÒflankÓ countries of Georgia and Moldova 
Although the presence of Russian arms in Georgia and Moldova has been 
contentious less publicly than the presence of RussiaÕs troops there, it 
nonetheless remains a sore point in NATO-Russia relations.  The Cold War-era 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) remains at the heart of the 
matter.  Since its inception more than 15 years ago, this arms-reduction treaty 
has gone through several iterations, the latest of which is called the Agreement 
on Adaptation of the CFE. (12)  Unfortunately, this Adaptation has yet to enter 
into force because Russia has yet to comply with the AdaptationÕs military 
reduction requirements for the ÒflankÓ regions of Moldova and Georgia. (13) 
 
There has been some progress in both places.  Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov 
and former Georgian Foreign Minister Zourabichrili in 2005 signed an agreement 
stipulating the removal of Russian military hardware from and the closure of 
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Russian bases in Georgia. (14)  Meanwhile, Russia has removed significant 
amounts of military stockpiles from Moldova. (15)  However, the Russian State 
Duma has questioned the legality of the Russia-Georgia arms agreement and 
some experts contend Russia has only destroyed or removed obsolete 
equipment from Moldova while it supports Russian-owned arms factories in 
Transdniestr. (16)  Furthermore, Russia uses a chicken-and-egg argument that it 
must maintain troops in Transdniestr to protect arms stockpiles that it cannot 
remove without first having a political settlement (which it continues to obstruct). 
(17) The very presence of until Russian troops and military arms poses an 
obstacle to a settlement. 
 
A place to air grievances 
DecemberÕs NRC meeting will be full of diplomatic niceties.  But, using history 
as a guide, the meeting also will serve as a forum in which Russia can air 
grievances and issue threats, something Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov 
did not hesitate to do in 2004. (18) The root cause of this antagonism is obvious: 
NATO continues to expand into areas that Russia claims are in its sphere of 
influence. Last year the Baltic states joined NATO, a move that encountered 
particularly vitriolic Russian rhetoric. This year, Georgia and Moldova entered on 
the path that leads to eventual NATO membership, and NATOÕs anti-terrorism 
exercise, Active Endeavor, may include Black Sea waters. (19) Although Russia 
has promised a better relationship with NATO, it will pursue what it describes as 
Russian self-interests in the Black Sea, Georgia, and Moldova, even at the 
expense of a meaningful partnership with NATO. 
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GEORGIA 
Who should take Georgia to the prom? 
Just in case there was any doubt in which diplomatic direction Georgia is leaning, 
Tbilisi issued the countryÕs National Military Strategy late last month that put all 
questions to rest.  The document, a requirement for NATO, was drafted by the 
General Staff, parliamentÕs Committee on National Defense and Security, non-
governmental organizations and other experts, from Georgia and some NATO 
countries. (1)  In the document, Tbilisi points to the continued existence of 
Russian military bases on Georgian soil as a Òdestabilizing factorÓ along with 
instability in the North Caucasus, armed formations in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, and new crisis points on other Georgian territory. (2) 
 
To counter these and other threats, the Georgian military (reformed to NATO 
standards) will receive a significant chunk of the national budget, to the tune of 
about US$218 million, for 2006. (3) 
 
In a response only missing the words Òsays you,Ó the Russian Foreign Ministry 
criticized the notion that Russian troops could be considered destabilizing:  ÒThe 
absurdity of such assertions is apparent,Ó he said.  (4) 
 
Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and his cabinet have made no secret of 
the countryÕs plans to join the alliance.  According to the State Minister for Euro-
Atlantic Integration, Giorgi Baramidze, once the country finishes work on the 
NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), ÒWe hope our relations will 
then move to a higher level: the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP).Ó Still, 
Georgia is ready to keep open the doors to all powers:  ÒWe are looking for 
opportunities to cooperate with Russia, with which we have more common 
interests than disputes,Ó he added. (5) 
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Georgia is not above using its new best friend to put added pressure on Russia 
to continue working toward troop withdrawal; Tbilisi proposed that NATO monitor 
the withdrawal from Russian bases in Georgia once the final protocol is signed. 
(6)  Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli asserted further that GeorgiaÕs 
plan for settling the conflict in South Ossetia had garnered the approval of the 
European Union, NATO and the Belgian government following the ministerÕs trip 
to Brussels.  (7)  Officials from Russia and the two separatists republics, South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia, of course, most definitely have not agreed to the plan.  (8) 
 
In terms of alliances, though, Georgia is not limiting itself to NATO.  According to 
the PresidentÕs Chief of Staff, Giorgi Arveladze, an international forum held last 
week in Kyiv was intended to create an Òaxis of democratic countries that do not 
wish to be in the orbit of Russian influence.Ó Included in the forum were the 
heads of state of countries that have struggled to regain and retain independence 
from Moscow, such as Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Moldova, as well 
as representatives of some states in the Balkans. (9)  Despite ArveladzeÕs clear 
speaking, Saakashvili appeasingly said subsequently the new ÒDemocratic 
Choice CommunityÓ to be formed as a result of the forum was not Òan anti-
Russian association.Ó  ÒNo one in Georgia could say such a stupid thing.  
Russia will only benefit from gaining neighboring democratic states,Ó the 
Georgian president said. (10)  Perhaps one should note that Arveladze was not 
Òin GeorgiaÓ when he made his remarks. 
 
Meanwhile, comments from the Georgian parliament that the country should 
consider withdrawing from the Commonwealth of Independent States resulted in 
a less-than-friendly shot across the bow from counterparts in Moscow.  
According to Russian Duma deputy Aleksei Mitrofanov, Russia should bomb 
Tbilisi and install Igor Giorgadze, GeorgiaÕs former security chief now in exile, in 
place of Saakashvili.  (11)  The parliamentary scuffling was put to rest when 
Nogaideli attended the Council of the CIS Heads of Government meeting in the 
Russian capital.  
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ARMENIA 
Not in my yard 
Armenian President Robert Kocharian, on the other hand, stressed that aspiring 
to NATO membership is not on the agenda in Yerevan.  ÒNow just look at the 
political map of the world, at the South Caucasus with always strong Russian 
influence and at Armenia bordering on Turkey and Iran and ask yourselves – will 
membership of NATO increase ArmeniaÕs security or not?,Ó he said, ÒThat is 
why we are not talking about membership of NATO or setting ourselves such a 
task.Ó (12) 
 
Who could say ÔnoÕ? 
ArmeniaÕs recent nationwide constitutional referendum also has generated its 
share of international ink, as opponents of the expansion of parliamentary 
powers balk at accepting the stated results of the poll.  
 
Before results were announced, the opposition accused the president and 
prosecutor-general of applying open pressure and blackmail to opposition 
representatives.  (13) Alas, the opposition demanded the annulment of the 
results by the Central Election Commission, or Òappropriate political stepsÓ 
would be taken; however, the CEC responded that the Constitutional Court, not 
the CEC, was the place where appeals could be heard.  (14)  In any case, 
appeals should be heard, given the preliminary results:  according to the Central 
Commission for the Referendum chairman Garegin Azarian, over 93 percent of 
Armenian voters approved the constitutional amendment.  (15) 
 
Despite noting instances where Òthe low turnout in many elections districts in 
Yerevan and in the regions contradicts the exaggerated figured reported by the 
electoral commissions,Ó  Òsome forged signatures of electorsÓ and the breach 
of the principle of secret balloting, as well as Òunequal conditions for the 
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opponentsÓ of the reform, monitors from the Council of Europe announced that 
the voting met Òinternational criteriaÓ in most districts.  (16)  
 
CHECHNYA 
Military presence notable on streets and at polls 
To the surprise of absolutely no one, the parliamentary elections backed by the 
Moscow-supported president of Chechnya, Alu Alkhanov, resulted in an 
overwhelming majority of the Moscow-supporting United Russia Party on 27 
November.  Chechen rebels declared the election a Òfarce,Ó citing empty polling 
stations, Òthousands of occupiers and puppets armed to the teethÓ and the 
number of soldiers voting outnumbering the civilian electorate.  (17)  In the 
capital, their allegations seem on target: According to representatives of the 
Memorial human rights center, Òresidents of Grozny largely ignored the 
parliamentary elections.  Moreover, Memorial registered differences between 
figures provided by election commission heads and observers from political 
parties.Ó  (18)  
 
Furthermore, indicating indifference to how such displays of force might affect 
perceptions of democracy in action, Russian officials did not deny that there was 
an extraordinary number of Russian military representatives marking ballots; 
more than 33,000 Defense Ministry, Interior Ministry and Border Guard troops 
were included on the voter lists.  ÒThese service personnel were accorded the 
right to take part in a poll to elect the Chechen parliament because they are 
permanently stationed on the (Chechen) republicÕs territory,Ó said one source 
from the headquarters of the Combined Group of Forces in the North Caucasus.  
(19) 
 
While few international observers considered overseeing what is, in fact, a 
regional election within Russia (and an extremely violent region at that), the head 
of the PACE delegation to Chechnya, Andreas Gross, expressed doubts that 
sufficiently democratic conditions existed on the ground, given intimidation by law 
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enforcement bodies, and the continued killings and kidnappings besetting 
Chechnya. (20)  Apparently, one needs to be armed with more than an 
awareness of democratic precepts to venture into polling stations. 
 
AZERBAIJAN 
Opposition beaten 
Opponents of President Ilham AliyevÕs hold of the Azerbaijani government may 
have been unable to make themselves heard before and during the recent 
parliamentary elections in that country, but they have managed to make their 
presence known now that the polling has ended.  Unfortunately, many have 
become quite bruised (literally) in the attempt.  Post-election rallies succeeded in 
generating substantial numbers of supporters, but they also succeeded in 
generating the attention of the authorities.  The most recent rally, held on 26 
November, ended with the use of water cannons and batons against participants 
and the arrest of around 30 protesters, on the premise that the rally was 
threatening the peace by exceeding the 2-hour limit imposed by government 
officials. (21) 
 
The president of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), 
as well as the US and UK embassies in Baku, condemned the rallyÕs violent 
suppression; so, too, did representatives of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe.  (22) 
 
Opposition leaders, faced with the governmentÕs refusal of permission to hold a 
3 December rally in downtown Baku, postponed the planned gathering for a 
week. (23)  At this point, opponents can only hope, and even then likely in vain, 
for international sanctions. Since they have not been forthcoming to this point, 
however, it is unlikely that sanctions will be issued, particularly since the new Mill 
Majilis session opened on 2 December.  The elections were generally seen by 
Western observers as a step, but a small step, in the right direction, towards 
democracy; however, most observers noted illegalities and irregularities at 
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several polling stations. (24)  But after annulling the results from 10 
constituencies, last week the Constitutional Court endorsed enough of the results 
to allow parliament to sit. (25) 
 
Source Notes: 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Fabian Adami 
 
KAZAKHSTAN 
Presidential Elections. 
On Sunday December 4, the Republic of Kazakhstan held Presidential elections. 
Although the polls were widely expected to result in a Òclean sweepÓ for the 
incumbent Nursultan Nazarbaev, the President and his supporters took no 
chances. In order to ensure a smooth electoral process, the President and those 
close to him have, during the last six months, engaged in a systemic campaign 
aimed at discrediting and intimidating the country's opposition forces. 
 
In June 2005, a series of bills were introduced to the Majlis designed to stifle the 
operations of foreign and domestic NGOs. Had the bills passed, these 
organizations would have faced government audits at best, and closure at worst. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the Kazakh Supreme Constitutional Council in late 
August ruled that the bills were unconstitutional. (1) 
 
President Nazarbaev's reaction to the Council's ruling revealed his motivation for 
having the bills introduced. During a September 2005 press conference, he 
stated that NGOs would be subject to close observation in the run-up to the 
election, and that they would not be allowed to place their support behind any 
one candidate. Moreover, he explicitly noted the alleged activities of NGOs in 
fomenting revolutions in "neighboring countries," where NGOs had "pumped 
money and destabilized society." (2) 
 
The President's most ÒdangerousÓ opponent in the polls was Zharmakhan 
Tuyakbai, former member of Otan (Nazarbaev's party), and Speaker of the 
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Majlis.  Tuyakbai has been at the center of the government's anti-opposition 
efforts. First, in mid-August, Tuyakbai was warned about "illegal campaigning." 
(3) In late September, computers and other electronic equipment were damaged 
in an apparent arson attack on his campaign headquarters. Then on 12 October, 
Tuyakbai's campaign manager, Tolen Tokhasynov, was arrested for organizing 
illegal political meetings in Almaty. Tokhasynov has apparently still not been 
released. Finally, several tons of campaign material was destroyed when the car 
transporting it between Almaty and Semipalatinsk caught fire in an Òaccident.Ó 
(4) 
 
Tuyakbai's entourage and close supporters have not been immune from 
(apparent) government actions. On 2 November, Yelena Nikitna, another 
campaign official, reported her daughter missing. Nikitna claimed that her 
daughter had disappeared after she refused to cooperate with police by informing 
on Tuyakbai's campaign. (5) No reports have emerged that indicate Oksana 
Nikitna's safe return. Nikitna's apparent kidnapping is as disturbing as the 
assassination of Zamanbek Nurkadilov. 
 
Zamanbek Nurkadilov was, until last year, a government minister and close ally 
of the President. More recently, he had been a vocal Tuyakbai supporter. On the 
weekend of 12 November, Nurkadilov was found dead in his Almaty home. 
According to his lawyer, he had been shot twice in the chest and once in the 
head. (6) 
 
An investigation into Nurkadilov's death launched by the Interior Ministry 
concluded that Nurkadilov had committed suicide due to "family conflict." (7) This 
conclusion is ÒsupportedÓ by the fact that Nurkadilov's home (according to 
police) showed no sign of struggle or forced entry. (8) Evidence cited by Serikali 
Musin, Nurkadilov's lawyer makes the suicide conclusion nefarious at best. Musin 
claims that a small pillow found at the house contained a gunshot hole, 
suggesting it was used as a silencer or muffler. (9) 
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In an incident bound to cast further suspicion upon the government, Nurkadilov's 
widow, Makpal Zhunusova called a press conference in Almaty on 25 November. 
During the session–held with Musin, Zhunusova displayed what appeared to be a 
covert microphone, which she claimed had been planted in her home by the 
authorities after her husbands' death. (10). It seems likely Security Forces were 
seeking to monitor her activities during their investigation and, given her 
husband's opposition to Nazarbaev, during the election. Weeks prior to his death, 
Nurkadilov announced that he was in possession of documents proving "massive 
corruption" in the President's family. (11) It seems evident that the aim of 
Nurkadilov's murderers was to prevent this evidence from becoming public 
knowledge. 
 
In addition to the Òdirect measuresÓ described above, the Kazakh government's 
rhetoric against the opposition was stepped up in the weeks prior to the election. 
On 17 November, the Interior Minister, Baurzhan Mukhamejanov, claimed that 
the opposition was "arming radicals" in preparation for mass demonstrations, and 
that some groups were attempting to bribe election officials. (12) Then, on 24 
November, Kazakhstan's NSS (successor to the KGB) issued an official 
statement noting that opposition groups were preparing "ill-considered" behavior 
before and during the polls, and warning that attempts to destabilize the country 
would be "severely dealt with." (13) It should be noted at this juncture, that 
Zharmakhan Tuyakbai has explicitly denied any opposition plans for unrest 
during or after the election. (14) 
 
In spite of these Òdirty tricksÓ, the Kazakh government attempted to present a 
Òfair and democraticÓ image to the outside world. On 17 November, four of the 
Presidential candidates participated in a debate, portrayed by the government as 
central to the election. Televised by Khabar TV (owned by President Nazarbaev's 
daughter Dariga), the discussion covered a number of issues, including 
corruption, poverty and unemployment. (15) President Nazarbaev did not 
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participate since he was on a state visit to Ukraine. If anything, his absence 
signified that he was not truly concerned about his electoral chances, or the 
likelihood of a Kazakh Òcolor revolution.Ó Secondly, on 28 November, the 
Central Election Commission announced that in line with requests from some 
observers, the election would take place without the use of envelopes, due to the 
fact that they could be used for illegal ballot stuffing. (16) 
 
Voting began at 7:00 am Kazakh time on Sunday, with many of the 9,500 polling 
stations using the same Sailau electronic system that was used during last year's 
Parliamentary elections.  According to CEC Chairman Onalsyn Zhumabekov, 
some 10% of registered eligible voters had cast their ballot by 11:00 am. (17) 
When voting stations closed at 8:00 pm local time, exit polls suggested that 
Nazarbaev had obtained between 77 and 87% of votes, while Tuyakbai obtained 
a mere 7-13%. (18)   
 
A Nazarbaev landslide was confirmed Monday morning when the Central 
Election Commission reported its preliminary results. According to the CEC, the 
President obtained 91% of the vote, while his closest opponent, Zharmakhan 
Tuyakbai achieved a paltry 6.6%. (19) Final results are expected in 
approximately ten days. 
 
The OSCE, in its preliminary report, has noted that there were "some 
improvements" in the election process, most notably in that voters were provided 
with an "opportunity of choice," with five candidates running. (20) But the report 
referred to numerous violations including intimidation, harassment and lack of 
opportunity for candidates equally to present their views. Violations—such as 
ballot stuffing and proxy voting, were observed in 27% of vote counts, while 
"serious violations," including results protocol tampering were seen in 21% of 
vote counts. (21) The OSCE's final report will be published in two months. 
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 President Nazarbaev's victory is not unexpected—many observers predicted 
that Kazakhs would "vote for stability." (22) In light of the country's past electoral 
history and Nazarbaev's skill at suppressing or undermining his opponents, a 
Tuyakbai victory was effectively impossible.  Given Nazarbaev's recent 
exhibitions of paranoia vis ˆ vis revolution, it is safe to predict that the OSCE's 
report will find that vote count inflations are worse than they have been in prior 
ballots. 
 
The Bear hug 
In May 2005, the Uzbek government responded to peaceful protests in Andijan 
with a massive show of force. After surrounding and cutting off the town, Interior 
Ministry forces moved in, killing up to 700 people. (23) The massacre resulted in 
widespread condemnation of the Uzbek regime's Human Rights record from 
governments worldwide, including those of the United States, and Britain, as well 
as in calls for an independent inquiry into the incident. (24) 
 
The Uzbek government's response to criticism has been to reject it out of hand. 
In July, President Islam Karimov apparently was behind calls from the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization for a timetable of US base closures in Central Asia. 
(25) On 31 July, the Uzbek government officially notified the US government that 
its forces had six months to vacate the K2 airbase, 90 miles north of the Afghan 
border. (26) Four months later, on 22 November, the US announced officially that 
the base had been vacated. (27) 
 
Throughout the last six months, President Islam Karimov has received support—
if not praise—from Moscow for his handling of Andijan. The Russian government 
has openly supported the Uzbek version of events, claiming that its own 
intelligence services (presumably SVR) had known of the terrorists' plans and 
Afghan connections. (28) 
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In contrast to the Russian response, the criticism from the US over Andijan has—
at least according to President Karimov—driven Uzbekistan back into Russia's 
arms. On 14 November, as he prepared to travel to Moscow for talks with 
President Vladimir Putin, Karimov claimed that "the resentful forces that have 
been told to leave the Khanabad airfield will not rest. They never tire of 
subversive activities." (29) Karimov intimated that the goal of these "resentful 
forces" was to discredit the Uzbek government and "make Uzbekistan obey."  
Karimov's remarks linked the (now former) US presence in the country to the 
alliance treaty he would conclude with Putin the same day:  "When this 
agreement comes into effect, any hostile actions directed against Uzbekistan, 
any attempts to attack or occupy Uzbekistan will mean an assault on Russia." 
(30) 
 
The alliance treaty—conspicuously signed on the same day that the Supreme 
Court delivered guilty verdicts and 14-20 year jail sentences in the Andijan trial 
(31), contains a clause (Article 2), which states that: "If an act of aggression is 
committed against one of the sides by any state or group of states, this will be 
viewed as an act of aggression against both sides." (32) Militarily, the treaty also 
provides for basing agreements between the two countries, as well as for 
weapons transfers—which apparently have already begun. (33) The treaty also 
encompasses economic and trade clauses, with Russian companies such as 
LUKoil and Gazprom seeking to invest up to $2.5 Billion in Uzbekistan. (34) 
 
President Karimov has clearly chosen to return to Russia's embrace. But 
questions remain as to how deep the relationship really is. Will Uzbekistan cut all 
links with GUUAM and join the Common Security Treaty Organization (currently 
comprising Kazakhstan, Armenia, Belarus, Russia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan)? 
Will Russian bases be established in Uzbekistan, and finally, will the remaining 
Western troops (such as the German contingent at Termez) also be evicted? 
 
Source Notes: 
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BELARUS 
Soviet times are here again 
Today, if Senator John McCain were a Belarusian politician in Belarus, it is likely 
that he would be in prison.  If Senator Joseph Biden were a Belarusian 
opposition politician in Belarus, probably he would be serving time in a labor 
colony.    What would be their crime?  Questioning – no matter how benignly – 
the policies or actions of their countryÕs president. 
 
For several years now, such action has been illegal in Belarus and punishable by 
extended time in prison or labor camps.  This law has been a powerful tool 
against the countryÕs strongest opposition politicians, most of whom now sit 
behind bars.  
 
But beginning in the very near future, as a result of anticipated changes to 
Belarusian criminal codes, not only politicians or outspoken activists, but also 
journalists, human rights monitors and even heads of polling firms run the risk of 
similar treatment.   Such is the state run by the man President Bush once called 
ÒEuropeÕs last dictator,Ó Aleksandr Lukashenko. 
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Last week, Lukashenko took the latest step in his stated plan to maintain a link 
with Soviet times.  In the 11 years of his rule, the man, who became president in 
elections widely condemned as rigged, has reintroduced Soviet symbols and 
continues to perpetuate the cults of personality surrounding Lenin and Stalin.   
But most importantly, he has worked hard to maintain the police state left to 
Belarus as the Soviet UnionÕs legacy.  
 
On 2 December, this police state reached new levels when the rubber stamp 
lower house of parliament overwhelmingly passed new criminal codes.  These 
codes will allow the authorities to label as criminal any protest gathering, 
publication or broadcast of negative information about the state, as well as the 
receipt of assistance from international organizations or foreign countries.  
 
In the future, the Tom BrokawÕs of Belarus would be behind bars for relaying 
both positive and negative news about the country, as would the Bob GeldofÕs, 
for organizing gatherings to spotlight policies that need improvement.  
 
International Helsinki Federation Executive Director Aaron Rhodes heavily 
criticized the proposed new codes, grouped together under the general category 
of ÒDiscrediting the Republic of Belarus.Ó ÒIf adopted,Ó he said, Òthis law 
could be interpreted to render human rights monitoring and reporting as well as 
any kind of criticism of the authorities illegal.Ó (1)  
 
Belarusian politicians and journalists also reacted strongly, with Aleksandr 
Milinkevich, LukashenkoÕs sole opponent in next yearÕs presidential election, 
suggesting simply, ÒThis is a return to Stalinism.Ó (2) 
 
The bill must now pass the upper house and then be signed by Lukashenko, and 
both the European Union and the United States released almost identically 
worded statements calling on Lukashenko not to sign the law or face Òserious 
consequences.Ó    (3) 
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However, comments by the head of BelarusÕ KGB – as the security service is 
still known – suggest that Lukashenko and his allies are unconcerned about 
Western condemnation of their actions.   ÒWe have to protect national security 
and prevent color revolutions like those that happened in Georgia, Ukraine and 
Kyrgyzstan,Ó Stepan Sukharenko said.  (4) 
 
Clearly, Lukashenko has presidential elections on his mind.  To maintain his own 
power, he must win, and no rhetorical criticism from Tony Blair or George Bush is 
likely to deter him from this goal.  
 
Moreover, Lukashenko is regularly and repeatedly Òpropped upÓ by neighbor 
Russia.  This support enables Lukashenko to continue to pursue whatever policy 
he wishes, as long as it is not strongly opposed by the Kremlin.   
 
In return, Russia receives preferential treatment when state assets are 
disbursed, the right to deploy weaponry on BelarusÕs soil – at the border of the 
European Union and NATO – and a firm outpost against the creeping 
ÒWesternizationÓ of Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
Just this week, É Kosachov, chairman of the Russian State Duma Foreign Affairs 
Committee, defended Belarus against strong (and increasing) criticism of it by 
Polish officials.  ÒPolandÕs meddling in the internal affairs of Belarus, is in the 
view of Russia, inadmissible and uncivilized.Ó  (5)  It is unclear whether 
Kosachov was expressing an official opinion, but notably, his statement was not 
retracted or questioned by any higher-ranking Russian official.   
 
Even more importantly, this week, Russia confirmed that Belarus would continue 
to receive Russian gas at the bargain price of just over $46 per cubic meter.  This 
is in direct opposition to RussiaÕs attempts to force Ukraine, Moldova and 
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Georgia to more than double the price they are currently paying.  In fact, Russian 
energy is BelarusÕ main lifeline.   
 
As reported previously in TIA, a Bratislava-based NGO recently completed an 
examination of BelarusÕ energy market in relation to its economy, and 
suggested that in order to have an impact on LukashenkoÕs actions, oil exports 
to the EU should be frozen.  This, the Pontis Foundation said, Òcould strike a 
direct blow against the Minsk government by blocking oil exports from Belarus.Ó  
(6)  
 
The study found that Belarusian authorities and government-owned businesses 
make considerable profits by importing Russian oil into Belarus at bargain prices 
and then exporting it to the EU at market–or just below market–prices.  These 
contracts with the EU are reportedly worth up to 3.3 billion euros each year and 
allow Lukashenko to maintain his country at a minimum subsistence level.  
Without these funds, the Belarusian president would be forced to reform the 
economy and allow his citizens more Western contact. 
 
Other opposition activists in Belarus have also called on the EU to take a stand 
against RussiaÕs ascension to the G8 presidency next month, in response to 
Russian support for LukashenkoÕs regime.  However, the EU has so far refused 
to punish Moscow for new draft Russian laws that could force Western-based 
NGOs out of Russia, and even place EU citizens at risk of harassment or 
detention.  Consequently, it seems unlikely that the organization–or the US for 
that matter–will concern itself with pushing Russia to end its support for 
Lukashenko.  
 
Nevertheless, Amnesty International in Poland is undertaking a campaign to 
raise awareness of the situation in Belarus.  ÒSilence is the worst thing,Ó 
Amnesty-Poland Spokesperson Mirella Tanek said.  ÒPeople need to be made 
aware of what is happening in Belarus.Ó (7)  Tanek is no doubt glad to be in 
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Poland.  If she were in Belarus, she would be waiting undoubtedly for a knock on 
the door. 
 
UKRAINE 
The price of democratic choice 
Over the last several weeks, Ukraine demonstrated considerable progress in its 
relations with Western and Central Europe, hosting a successful EU-Ukraine 
summit, and sponsoring a major gathering of Central and Southeastern 
European leaders.  Not coincidentally, at the same time, relations between 
Russia and Ukraine seem to have taken yet another downturn, with Russia 
angrily demanding that Kyiv more than double the price it pays for natural gas.  
 
I. Sand in the eye of the lion 
In early December, Ukraine worked toward its stated desire to position itself as a 
regional hub when President Viktor Yushchenko hosted British Prime Minister 
Tony Blair for the EU-Ukraine Summit, and oversaw the successful completion of 
the Community of Democratic Choice international forum, containing 
democracies and countries embarked on a democratic path.  
 
The EU-Ukraine summit was notable primarily for the announcement that 
Ukraine immediately would be granted market economy status.  Although the 
economic benefit is unknown and possibly small, the political symbolism of being 
accepted onto the EU economic playing field is huge.   The two also signed an 
agreement on joint satellite navigation (the Galileo project) and a memorandum 
on energy security aimed at the Òprogressive integration of the Ukrainian energy 
market to the EU.Ó  (8) 
 
But Yushchenko must have been most buoyed by the positive – and somewhat 
unexpected – praise both from Blair personally and within the summit 
declaration.    
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Blair hailed ÒsignificantÓ progress on UkraineÕs fulfillment of the EU-Ukraine 
Action Plan, suggesting that if the country continues to move forward "the 
possibilities are limitless in developing our relationship." Further, he praised "a 
new and deeper and stronger relationship between the European Union and 
Ukraine." (9) 
 
Additionally, the summit declaration welcomed ÒUkraineÕs firm commitment to 
shared values of democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights,Ó noted 
Òprogress made in promoting economic reforms,Ó recognized the countryÕs 
leadership in the area of regional stability, and further noted Ònew prospects for 
a considerable enhancement of the level and quality of EU-Ukraine relations.Ó 
(10)  
 
The fact that these statements occurred in Kyiv at this particular time was 
intensely symbolic, especially when the EU-Russia summit was held days later 
not in Moscow, but in London. 
 
Not long after Blair departed Kyiv, Ukraine opened the forum of the Community 
of Democratic Choice – founded by Yushchenko and Georgian President Mikhail 
Saakashvili in order to support states transitioning to democracy.  According to 
TV 5 Kanal, 120 participants from 18 countries attended the event.  ÒThe forum 
is not traditional,Ó the station announced.  ÒThe first to meet are not state 
officials, but representatives of the so-called NGOs, various foundations, centers 
and institutions.Ó (11) 
 
While the attempt to allow civic activists to mingle and exchange ideas was a 
crucial part of the event, the spotlight shone squarely on the significant number of 
state leaders in attendance.  The presidents of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Moldova, Romania, Macedonia, Georgia and Slovenia took part, as did US 
Undersecretary for Democracy and Global Affairs Paula Dobriansky, who read a 
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greeting from US President George Bush.  Representatives of the Council of 
Europe and the OSCE also attended as observers. 
 
Organizers seemed to go out of their way to provide the opportunity for 
Belarusian opposition presidential candidate Alyaksandr Milinkevich to speak.  In 
his presentation, Milinkevich resurrected the rhetoric of the Orange Revolution.  
ÒIf our demands to the government that the election must be in line with the 
constitution are not satisfied, we will invite people to the streets,Ó he said.  This 
will be a peaceful revolution, this will be a revolution similar to that in Ukraine.Ó  
(12) 
 
In response, the forum adopted a strongly-worded resolution expressing 
Òserious concern over the situation in Belarus where the dictatorship of 
Lukashenko openly violates human rights and basic freedoms.Ó  (13) 
Yushchenko and Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin also urged joint action to 
settle the Transnistria conflict, and Voronin, in particular, urged closer integration 
– up to the creation of a parliamentary assembly.  ÒWe would like to see,Ó he 
said, Òintegration of countries seeking implementation of European institutions 
and the adoption of ensuing values.Ó (14) 
 
In the first six months of 2006, forums will be convened in Bucharest and Vilnius, 
as Ukraine works to increase the joint power of the countries in the Black Sea, 
Baltic and Caspian regions.  Or, as Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus said, 
ÒÉ a new power that can be seen and heard.Ó (15) 
 
Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko quickly lashed out at the grouping, 
saying it Òhas no future,Ó while Russian President Vladimir Putin, who was 
invited to the event, simply ignored it.  It is clear from the reemergence of the gas 
conflict between Ukraine and Russia, however, that the Kremlin does not intend 
to allow Kyiv to proceed easily with its plan to create a new center of power on 
RussiaÕs doorstep.  
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II. The Gas Wars 
UkraineÕs row with Russia over the price Kyiv pays for gas ended recently with 
negotiations postponed indefinitely, calls on Europe for support by both sides, 
and an accusation that UkraineÕs position would result in the interruption of 
EuropeÕs gas supplies from Siberia.  
 
At issue is the extremely low price paid by Kyiv currently for Russian gas – $50 
per cubic meter for a portion of the supply and $80 per cubic meter for the rest.  
This price is less than half the current European average of $160.  
 
The discounted price is one part of a well-worn Russian strategy to keep former 
Soviet republics close by fostering interdependence in the areas of military, 
security, energy and transport.  As such, all former Soviet republics — with the 
exception of the Baltic States — always have received preferential pricing 
agreements with RussiaÕs Gazprom.  In UkraineÕs case, its gas price also 
takes into consideration the countryÕs vital role in transiting the vast majority of 
Russian gas to Europe.  
 
But Gazprom officials now suggest that they want to transform their company into 
a modern, market-based entity, and make Òthe first steps toward European 
standards of payment in gas deals.Ó (16) This, they said, would necessitate a 
shift to market-based prices. 
 
This argument has merit, and given the increase in world gas prices, it would, at 
first glance, seem inappropriate to expect Gazprom to continue to provide such 
deep discounts to the former Soviet republics.  
 
This case loses considerable momentum, however, when the 2006 gas prices 
being demanded of the various republics are examined.   For example, Gazprom 
is demanding that Armenia — which is on very good terms with Russia — and 
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Ukraine pay vastly different prices ($110 vs. $160, respectively).  "Since the 
distance to Armenia and Ukraine is roughly the same,Ó Dmitri Mangilev of 
RussiaÕs Prospect brokerage firm said, Òwe can assume that private likes and 
dislikes play a part in deciding gas prices for them." (17)  
 
Gazprom has also requested $120 per cubic meter from Georgia and $150 from 
Moldova, major increases for countries that, like Ukraine, have very difficult 
relations with Russia. At the same time, RussiaÕs closest ally, Belarus, will see 
no increase in its price, paying less than $47 per cubic meter.  The self-styled 
Transnistria republic — an largely ethnic-Russian separatist enclave on 
Moldovan territory — also will see no increase in its energy costs, although the 
price it pays, if any, has not been announced publicly.  And Russia itself will 
continue to pay under $30 per cubic meter for GazpromÕs gas.  Clearly, market 
prices are not GazpromÕs primary consideration. 
 
After Ukrainian representatives broke off negotiations, a Gazprom statement 
said, ÒUkraineÕs unconstructive attitude . . . threatens the energy security of 
European consumers of Russian gas as well as of Ukraine itself.Ó (18)  
Moreover, Gazprom Deputy Chairman Aleksandr Medvedev announced that his 
company had protested to the European Commission.  (19) 
 
Meanwhile, Andrei Kokoshin, Chairman of the Russian State Duma Committee 
on International Affairs, made clear that GazpromÕs new demands are not 
based on economic concerns.  ÒOur purpose is to create a competent integrated 
association uniting Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus,Ó he said.  ÒIf 
Ukraine demonstrates political and economic movement toward the Euro-Atlantic 
[region], RussiaÕs subsidies of the Ukrainian industry at the expense of gas 
prices are absolutely illogical.Ó  (20) 
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Medvedev, for his part, suggested last week that Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova 
should agree to GazpromÕs new prices before the end of the year, but did not 
say what would happen if they did not.   
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